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Abstract 
We have looked at the definition of units in numerous acquisition programs and 
discovered that the units reported are almost never simple; in some programs, no two units 
are the same, and almost invariably the units produced at the end of a long production run 
are substantially different from the early ones. We have identified three reasons why the 
units may differ. The first reason is changes over time, generally as system capabilities are 
improved. The second is due to mixed types, where units that are inherently dissimilar—
such as CH-47F and MH-47G helicopters—are produced by the same program and each is 
called one unit. The final reason why units can differ is reporting accidents. We give 
examples of all three and discuss possible methods of improving the reporting requirement 
Introduction 
Acquisition data are primarily about a few questions: “How much funding?,” “How 
much are we getting?,” “When are we obligating the funds?,” and “When are we getting 
what we paid for?” All of these questions are interesting, and none are straightforward. Most 
have been addressed elsewhere and continue to get attention. The question of “What are 
we getting?,” however, is generally treated as though it were simple. Our experience tells us 
that counting quantities is often not straightforward. This report describes the findings of 
research that has taken us deeper into this question, showing that quantities are almost 
always complicated.  
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The Director of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (D,PARCA),1 
asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to review the quality and utility of data used 
for acquisition oversight; we started with the question of quantities. 
Selected Acquisition Reports 
Section 2432 of Title 10 U.S.C. requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the 
Congress a yearly status report for each Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), 
known as the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), which provides performance, schedule, 
and cost data. Each SAR includes separate cost estimates for several categories. Both past 
actual costs and future anticipated costs are reported, as well as quantity of units, for the 
expected life of the program (DoD, 2016).  
Within the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) 
system—the repository for SAR data—the Track to Budget section identifies the budget 
program elements (PEs) and procurement line item numbers (LINs) for each appropriation 
associated with a program in a particular fiscal year, allowing the user to find the equivalent 
cost and quantity data in the President’s Budget (PB) Submission prepared in the same 
year.2 Reconciling SAR data with the equivalent PB Submission proves difficult, however, as 
cost estimates can vary between the two sources, and some PEs and LINs are shared 
among multiple programs in a non-transparent way. In some cases, the SAR and PB define 
quantities differently.  
Neither the PB nor the SAR is perfect. In general, the Justification Books that the 
Services produce annually to support the PB contain more detail, which is good for analysis, 
but if it extends beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), it is as a single column 
labeled To Complete. The PB also does not include much history, with most of it in a single 
column labeled Prior Years. The SAR reports costs in both Then Year (TY) and Base Year 
(BY) dollars, while the PB reports exclusively TY dollars. The SARs are the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD)’s primary data source for analyzing MDAPs. This dataset is 
what analysts from many different organizations typically use, per the recommendation of 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]) staff, who describe SAR data as “the official numbers.” 
Why Selected Acquisition Reports Matter 
The SARs are not the dataset used most often for decision-making inside the DoD. 
When senior leaders make large resource decisions, analysts most often assemble datasets 
to suit the needs of the decision-maker by pulling data from non-public systems or 
conducting data calls. Why then do we care about the quality of data in the SARs? 
The SARs matter for two reasons: triggering and research. What we call triggering is 
why the SARs were created. The Services trigger investigations when they seek milestone 
                                            
 
 
1 PARCA is an office that was under the aegis of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). 
2 The President’s Budget and annual SAR submissions both generally come out in the second quarter 
of each fiscal year. The years on a matching budget and SAR set differ by two. The budget is named 
for the year ahead, and the SAR is a snapshot of the program in the recent past. For example, in the 
second quarter of FY 2016, the FY 2017 budget was released, quickly followed by the December 
2015 SAR. 
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authorities from the OSD. The OSD can also trigger analyses for program reviews based on 
the Service’s annual submissions, such as the Program Objective Memorandum. Only the 
SARs provide regular information at the program level. For example, no other annual 
submission can tell OSD or the Congress about the projected procurement costs for a 
program that is expected to leave the development stage in five years.  
Research on defense acquisition is continuously occurring in government agencies, 
think tanks, universities, and other organizations. In the past, researchers looking across 
programs have considered amount of cost growth (McNicol, 2004), setting of production 
rates (Rogerson, 1991), comparisons among different commodity types (Drezner, 2011), 
and many other subjects. This research helps the government, and SARs are the best 
source for comparisons across programs. While it is the nature of research that we cannot 
predict which research projects will yield fruitful results, we know that better quality data will 
yield better research results. 
Nunn-McCurdy Breaches 
Critical Nunn-McCurdy (N-M) breaches are established by statute. If an MDAP 
sustains too much cost growth, a review takes place that generally leads to either changes 
in the program or, occasionally, termination. PMs generally want to avoid N M breaches. 
Too much cost growth is defined in terms of Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) or 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC): 
 APUC = Procurement Costs/Procurement Quantities 
 PAUC = Total Program Costs/(Procurement + Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation [RDT&E] Quantities) 
There are four possible critical N–M breaches, two for APUC and two for PAUC. The 
breach calculation is performed by measuring the percentage growth in APUC or PAUC. A 
critical breach occurs when the variable has increased by at least 25% against the current 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) or 50% against the original APB. The original APB is 
the APB that was established during the Milestone (MS) B decision (formerly Milestone II).  
Each SAR contains a unit cost report that compares the current APUC and PAUC 
estimates to the original APB and a second unit cost report comparing the estimates to the 
current APB if the current APB is not the same as the original one. 
Subprograms 
An MDAP’s baseline may indicate that it has multiple subprograms to increase 
visibility into the program’s activities. If so, each unit produced and each dollar spent is 
assigned to one of the subprograms. Subprograms have been used to distinguish variants 
of a system, such as two similar but not identical missiles, or to look at different parts of a 
system, such as engines and airframes. Each year, each subprogram has its APUC and 
PAUC calculated and compared to the baseline. According to the N-M Act (10 U.S.C. § 
2433), if any subprogram exceeds its thresholds, an N-M breach is declared for the entire 
program, not just the subprogram that exceeded its baseline. 
The popularity of subprograms has changed through the years, as can be seen in 
Figure 1. The total number of programs each year did not change much, but declaring 
subprograms became less common from 1998 to 2009, when a rebound started. It is not 
clear what has caused these changes. 
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Figure 1. Subprograms in MDAPs 1997–2015 
An Example of Budget and SAR Discrepancy: Gray Eagle 
Quantity reporting in the SAR is the focus of this report. We begin with a few 
illustrative examples. The Army’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle program acquires unmanned aerial 
systems (UASs). In the Track to Budget section of its 2015 SAR, the program identifies the 
following LINs within the Aircraft Procurement, Army appropriation:  
 A00005 (MQ-1 UAS); 
 A01001 (MQ-1 Payload, which includes funding for other programs); and  
 A01005 (Common Sensor Payload Full Motion Video (CSP FMV), a sub-Line 
Item Number to A01001).  
Both A01001 and A01005 are listed as shared. The quantities and costs found in 
these LINs in PB 2017, however, differ from those in Gray Eagle’s 2015 SAR, as shown in 
Table 1. Note that both sources project the program to finish in FY 2018. 
Table 1. Gray Eagle Program SAR and Budget Comparison 
 
The cost differences in FY 2015 and FY 2017 are minimal, but there is no obvious 
explanation for the more significant differences in FY 2016 and FY 2018 costs. In PB 2017, 
the unit of accounting for this program is one unmanned airplane. However, the capability is 
also dependent on how many ground assets for operating the systems are acquired and on 
the differences between aircraft, as they are not all the same. In the SAR, the quantity is 
measured in companies, each of which contains several aircraft with different configurations 
and some amount of ground equipment. There is a standard measure for what a company 
- 121 - 
is, but not all companies fit the standard description. While the SAR does include a great 
deal of detail in various written sections, this makes it difficult to use the quantities in the 
data for quantitative analysis. 
A Complex Example: The CH-47F Chinook Program 
The Army’s CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter program demonstrates challenges 
that can occur when counting quantities across years in both the PB and SAR. This program 
builds Chinook helicopters, which are easy to count, yet there are serious questions when 
looking at the data. 
First, the CH-47F program’s definition of one unit has changed over time. In the early 
days of the program (as reflected in the original June 1998 SAR), the plan was to SLEP3 
300 existing CH-47D helicopters to an updated configuration, which would be called the CH-
47F. In PB 2005, the plan was to SLEP 287 CH-47D helicopters to the CH 47F configuration 
and 50 MH-47E Special Operations helicopters to a new MH-47G configuration. The 
definition of a unit had changed to include both CH-47D/F conversions and MH-47E/G 
conversions, which produce distinct end items and have different expected costs. 
The Army’s February 2007 budget justification forms expanded the set of planned 
activities to include all of the following: 
 SLEPs of CH-47D to CH-47F 
 SLEPs of MH-47E to MH-47G 
 New builds of CH-47F from scratch for active duty Army units 
 New builds of CH-47F in a different configuration for National Guard units 
The reported and projected unit costs for these activities were all different. More to 
the point, the definition of a unit now included not only a remanufactured existing helicopter, 
but also a newly built helicopter of the same design. While these may be functionally 
identical from an operational point of view, there are reasons why an analyst would want to 
know how many of each were to be built—and at what cost. To further complicate matters, 
the helicopters produced (both SLEP and new build) employ a mix of mission subsystems, 
some of which could be repurposed from a remanufactured helicopter or other existing 
decommissioned helicopter, and some of which had to be built (and purchased) new. The 
type and number of repurposed subsystems continued to vary from year to year, so that the 
production inputs (and price) even for new build active component CH-47Fs were different 
from year to year. 
The end result of these changes is that any given unit produced by the CH-47F 
program might have any one of the MH-47G, CH-47F Army, or CH-47F National Guard 
configurations. A CH-47F unit might be remanufactured or built new. Whether 
remanufactured or new, it might include some unspecified mix of government-furnished 
(free) and contractor-furnished (at a price) mission subsystems. For example, as of the 2013 
PB submission (February 2012), 43 new build units had been produced at an average cost 
of $15 million, of which $1.1 million per unit was for government-furnished equipment (GFE). 
                                            
 
 
3 SLEP is the acronym for “Service Life Extension Program” and is often used as a verb in defense 
circles. A SLEP can be funded with either procurement or Operations and Maintenance dollars. 
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The estimated cost to complete the new build program was $2.19 billion for 112 units, or 
$19.5 million per unit, of which $2.4 million per unit was expected to be GFE. This reflects 
the expectation that units authorized through FY 2013 would use recovered avionics suites 
from existing aircraft, but that half of the new build units after that would require new-build 
(contractor-furnished) avionics. There were clearly anticipated differences in components 
and cost between units produced up to that point and units expected to be produced in the 
future. 
Furthermore, there are inconsistencies between the SAR and the PB submissions 
regarding which units comprise the CH-47F program. How new builds versus SLEPs are 
counted in different years is unusual and is described in detail in the Accidents chapter. 
Organization of This Paper 
We have divided the common differences among unit definitions into three buckets: 
changes over time, mixed types of units, and reporting accidents. It is not uncommon for 
more than one category to apply to a given program; the Chinook has all three. The next 
three chapters describe what each of these categories means, how confusions arise, and 
what analysts should do when trying to use cost reporting data. In Suggested Adjustments 
to Reporting, we make some modest recommendations for modifications to acquisition data 
reporting that could help make the data more useful for many sorts of analyses. As part of 
those recommendations, in A Thought Experiment: JLTV, we consider the Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program—how its reporting might have been done differently and 
what the ramifications of those differences might have been. 
Changes Over Time 
Implicit in the concept of a unit is that every instance of the unit should be identical. 
Every inch should be the same length, every second should have the same duration, and 
every run scored in a baseball game should count equally. As noted above, this is often not 
true of procurement units in MDAPs. One reason that non-identical units might arise is that 
the product may evolve over time. Even when counting quantities is simple, such as when 
counting helicopters or ships, the units procured at different times are usually different in 
both cost and capability. In our full report (Davis, Giles, & Tate, 2017), we detail changes 
over time in ships, tactical aircraft, and tactical land vehicles. In this excerpted report, we 
look only at one program, the Air Force’s AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air 
Missile (AMRAAM) program. 
The AMRAAM program was established at a Defense Systems Acquisition Review 
Council MS I Review in November 1978. After an extended development period, an 
acquisition baseline of 24,320 units was set in December 1988. The first production units 
were authorized under the FY 1987 budget and fielded in 1991. The acquisition target was 
reduced to 16,427 missiles in a 1992 re-baselining that also doubled the expected per-unit 
cost. 
The AIM-120 is still in production. The Air Force now intends to buy a total of 12,851 
missiles, and the Navy an additional 4,461 missiles, for a total of 17,312. The final unit is 
projected to be authorized in FY 2025, almost 40 years after the first unit.  
The explanation for the continued utility of the AIM-120 is that the missiles being 
produced today are nothing like the missiles that were produced in the early 1990s. Figure 2 
shows the history of average unit cost by annual production lot for AMRAAM missiles, with 
filled shapes showing historical data and open shapes, projections. After a typical initial 
learning curve, it is clear that there have been major changes to the program over its history. 
In fact, many upgrades, modifications, and wholesale redesigns of the missile have occurred 
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over time; the Teal Group reports seven (Teal Group Corporation, 2014, p. 133). Some were 
simply improvements, while others had new functions, such as the AIM-120C3, designed 
with smaller control surfaces to fit inside the weapons bay of an F-22 Raptor, and the AIM 
120D, which includes many new features such as Global Positioning System navigation and 
a two-way datalink. 
 
Figure 2. Annual Average Unit Cost for AMRAAM Missiles 
There is no sense in which an AIM-120D is “the same thing” as an AIM-120A, or 
even an AIM-120C7. This is a clear instance in which the implicit assumption that units are 
interchangeable has been violated. 
Of course, within the AMRAAM program, there is no confusion about the kinds of 
missiles that are currently being produced, their capabilities, or plans for future 
improvements. The question, then, is how the program might adjust its data reporting to 
enhance transparency for planners, analysts, and oversight bodies. 
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Mixed Types 
Program offices often procure different end items at the same time. These items are 
usually similar to each other but substantially different; yet, for quantity reporting purposes, 
each is considered one unit. This often comes about because of different missions or end 
users. Sometimes, the types are completely different. To illustrate this concept, in this paper 
we look at an electronics suite. 
The Navy’s Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) program 
acquires electronics suites to protect the various F/A-18 aircraft from radio frequency guided 
missiles. IDECM achieved MS II approval in October 1995, although it was too small at the 
time to be an MDAP. Because of changes, it became an MDAP in March 2008 and issued 
its first SAR in June 2008. The Mission & Description section of the December 2015 SAR 
describes the blocks as follows: 
 IDECM Block 1: A federated suite, consisting of the ALQ-165 On-Board 
Jammer (OBJ) and ALE-50 expendable decoy 
 IDECM Block 2: An integrated suite, consisting of the ALQ-214 OBJ and 
ALE-50 expendable decoy 
 IDECM Block 3: An integrated suite, consisting of the ALQ-214 OBJ and 
ALE-55 Fiber Optic Towed Decoy 
 IDECM Block 4: A Hardware Engineering Change Proposal to the ALQ-214 
OBJ to render it suitable for operation on F/A-18C/D aircraft, while retaining 
all functionality, when installed on F/A-18E/F  
The SAR contains two subprograms: IDECM Blocks 2/3 and IDECM Block 4. The 
December 2015 SAR reports an APUC of $2.502 million for Block 4 and a far lower APUC of 
$0.090 million for Block 2/3. This is because the quantities are so different. Block 4 has a 
quantity of 324, roughly the number of airplanes they will be protecting. Block 2/3 has a 
quantity of 12,805, although the Navy bought fewer than 600 F/A-18E/Fs in total. Eighty-five 
of the 12,805 were purchased with 1506 Navy Aircraft Procurement funds and the balance 
were or will be bought with 1508 Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps 
funds. We presume that those purchased with ammunition funding are only the disposable 
decoys. The unit costs based on the End Item Recurring Flyaway column in each year are 
presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. IDECM Block 2/3 Annual Unit Cost by Appropriation Type From the 
December 2015 SAR 
Even though showing the two unit costs on the same chart requires plotting them on 
a logarithmic scale, the two are both considered units for the official unit cost calculation. 
Just within the more expensive 1506 units, it is clear that there have been significant 
changes, as the cost there does not follow a typical learning shape, which would be 
expected to slope down. 
While the details have changed with time, the IDECM program has used this 
reporting system since it issued its first SAR in June 2008.  
Accidents 
The confusions described above generally come about because of some decision by 
leadership about how the data should be presented;4 this category, in contrast, is about 
cases in which it seems there were also outright errors in how the quantity numbers were 
put together. We do not know how frequently this happens, but we know that it does happen 
and can sometimes persist for several years. We do not suggest that any of the cases 
described below involve intent to confuse analysts, but they did have that effect. 
We used the term accidents (as opposed to mistakes or errors) because it was the 
term a government official in AT&L applied to reporting anomalies for programs like 
Chinook. We identified three in the December 2015 SARs: Chinook helicopters, the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle, and the ICBM Fuze modification programs. It is quite possible 
there are more. We only present the Chinook situation in detail, as the others were about 
how dollars were assigned within the program. 
                                            
 
 
4 Or, more precisely, leadership makes a decision about how the program should be managed and 
what systems it should produce, possibly without considering the impact this will have on the 
coherence and consistency of quantity or unit cost reporting. 
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As described in the section titled A Complex Example: The CH-47F Chinook 
Program, the CH-47F Chinook Improved Cargo Helicopter program made a number of 
changes to its definition of unit over the course of the program. In the December 2015 SAR, 
however, the program apparently lost track of how it had been defining a unit and submitted 
quantity and cost forecasts that did not include all of the units identified in the simultaneous 
PB submission.  
Figure 4 shows the discrepancy between predicted future quantities in the December 
2015 SAR and the corresponding 2017 PB. Through FY 2017, the total quantities match 
perfectly. Beginning in 2018, units described as SLEP units in the PB are missing from the 
SAR forecast. As a result, the projected cost of these units is not included in the SAR 
calculations of APUC, PAUC, APUC growth, or PAUC growth. 
 
Figure 4. SAR Versus PB Production Quantities for CH-47F 
Since the SAR and the concurrent PB are required by law to agree on costs and 
quantities within the FYDP, this is clearly an accident. 
There is also an ongoing mismatch between the SAR and PB with regard to the past 
quantity produced. In the SAR, every past unit produced is counted, regardless of whether it 
was a SLEP unit or a new build. In the PB, in the early years of the program, there were no 
top-level quantities reported, presumably on the basis that upgrades to CH 47F 
configuration were just one of many ongoing upgrades in the Army’s helicopter fleet. 
Typically, programs that perform multiple types of upgrades, but are not applying all of them 
to every legacy platform, report the number of each type of upgrade performed separately. 
They do not typically roll these up into a total quantity for the program’s LIN because the 
individual upgrades are not comparable and the number of platforms modified does not 
match the total number of any one type of modification. 
When the decision was made to build CH-47F helicopters as new builds, the 
program began reporting a total quantity of units at the line item level and chose to include 
both SLEP and new build units in this total. However, they never looked back to include 
previously produced SLEP units in the Prior Quantity total. As a result, each new SAR and 
PB submission disagree both on how many helicopters have been procured and on how 
many will have been procured in total when the program is finished. 
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Suggested Adjustments to Reporting 
One possible response to the issues described previously is to tell programs never to 
change what they are buying; once the baseline is set and the program is approved, the 
plan should be followed and the systems should not change. This assumption is implicit in 
the data reporting process. And yet, this has never been government practice, and we do 
not recommend that it be adopted. Our military goes to great lengths to provide our 
warfighters with the best possible equipment, and we should not forbid that just to make 
bookkeeping easier. We do offer some modest proposals that could make the reported data 
more useful, but first we need to be careful about incentives. 
Data and Incentives 
Data recording systems provide incentives. “You get what you pay for” is an old 
expression. In 2007, Dr. H. Thomas Johnson wrote, “Perhaps what you measure is what you 
get. More likely, what you measure is all you get” (2007). If the acquisition system’s data 
requirements are not aligned with the system’s goals, suboptimal performance may follow. 
This is exacerbated when penalties are associated with data reporting. Generally, people 
would prefer to report accurate data, but when the data will be used to justify punishment, 
the reporters are incentivized to either change the facts that lead to the data—possibly in 
creative and unproductive ways—or to provide incorrect data. 
The statute that defines the N-M breach specifies PAUC and APUC thresholds that 
influence program behavior. Since N-M reviews impose costs on programs and can trigger 
cancellation of a program, many people in defense acquisition, including program managers 
(PMs), try to avoid them. This likely accounts for some of what we see in data reporting 
today. 
Any changes made to the system need to be considered in this light. If people’s 
careers will depend on what data they report, at times those data are more likely to reflect 
what is needed to satisfy the checker rather than reality. Furthermore, people will bend 
reality to make the data look “right” even if that will not yield the best actual result for 
national security.  
Monitoring Changes Over Time 
If we accept that the units produced during the course of a program will change over 
time, PMs should be given useful and standardized ways to describe (and ideally quantify) 
those changes, both for past units produced and planned future production.  
The current taxonomy of SAR Variance Categories recognizes seven possible 
reasons for cost growth. Cost growth due to design changes must always be categorized as 
“Engineering,” lumping together planned and unplanned changes, as well as optional versus 
necessary changes. For oversight and analysis, it would be useful to be able to distinguish 
at least three sub-categories of “changes over time”: 
 Pre-planned product improvements (P3I), 
 Unplanned changes (necessary and unnecessary), and 
 Block upgrades or evolutionary acquisition. 
Pre-Planned Product Improvements (P3I) 
P3I is a form of spiral acquisition, in which the first units produced do not include all 
of the capabilities that the procuring Service has identified as being required. The reasons 
for delaying might be budgetary, technical, operational, or some combination. The key is 
that the program has a plan from the beginning to add specific known improvements and 
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has developed cost and schedule estimates for those improvements. This allows P3I costs 
to be included in the SAR and other program submissions. 
In the current SAR, or even the more detailed PB, it is difficult to report current or 
anticipated P3I costs in a transparent fashion. The additional costs beyond what the 
program would cost if the improvements were not made will be a mix of RDT&E costs (for 
developing and testing the new design), nonrecurring costs (for things like new 
documentation and tooling), end-item recurring flyaway (EIRF) costs (for actual production 
of the improved units), possible non end-item recurring flyaway (NEIRF) costs (if 
improvements are made to non-end-item systems), and support costs (if the cost of support 
and/or spares for the new design is not exactly the same as for the original design). 
For the marginal cost of improvements to be visible in the SAR, reporting would need 
to explicitly include P3I costs. One way to do this would be as follows:  
 If the planned improvements are small in number and to be done at a few 
discrete times during the production run, treat them like Block Upgrades (see 
Block Upgrades, Evolutionary Acquisition, and Agile Development section). 
 If the planned upgrades are more numerous and continuous, establish a 
Planned Upgrades subprogram and report the RDT&E and Procurement 
costs associated with planned changes to the original design under that 
subprogram. For each year in the SAR Annual Funding report, the program 
should report the following: 
o Under the main end item subprogram, report the quantity produced or 
planned and the estimated cost if those units had been made to the 
original design. 
o Under the Planned Upgrades subprogram, report zero quantity and 
the additional marginal procurement cost for the lot due to design 
changes. This additional cost should be split among EIRF, 
nonrecurring, and support costs in the usual way. 
o Report RDT&E costs for the original design under the primary end 
item subprogram. 
o Report RDT&E costs associated with planned design changes in the 
Planned Upgrades subprogram. 
This system would allow analysts to clearly understand how much of the price 
change over time was driven by planned improvements and how much was unexpected. It 
would support meaningful learning curve modeling and also provide some progress tracking 
of new capability insertions. The narrative portions of the SAR would describe the capability 
enhancements obtained to date, the plan for future insertion of new capabilities, and the 
unexpected changes made to the base program. 
On the other hand, this system introduces a potentially onerous new type of 
reporting—namely, the hypothetical cost of the units if they had all been made to the original 
design. This is not information programs currently possess, and there are potential pitfalls 
and perverse incentives in how programs might choose to compute and report these 
counterfactual costs. In particular, cost growth due to design changes that might have been 
necessary in the base program (e.g., for safety reasons, to meet threshold requirements, or 
due to diminishing manufacturing sources) could be allocated either to the base subprogram 
or to the P3I subprogram, whichever seemed least likely to risk an N-M breach. 
For N-M purposes, several regulatory changes might be beneficial. First, the primary 
end item and the Planned Upgrades should be treated as separate triggers. The primary 
- 129 - 
end item would use the usual PAUC and APUC thresholds. The Planned Upgrades 
subprogram might only have limits based on total cost growth, or perhaps time-phased cost 
growth (e.g., average cost per year, rather than average cost per unit). Ideally, a breach on 
the Planned Upgrades subprogram would not imply a breach on the base subprogram 
(although the reverse would not be true). 
Under this system, the main temptation for struggling programs would be to 
mischaracterize some of their core program cost growth as P3I, so as to avoid an N-M 
breach on the primary end item. By shedding planned improvements, the program could 
avoid having an N-M breach on either subprogram. This is not necessarily a bad thing. The 
oversight challenge would be to align operational test criteria with the phased capabilities to 
be produced. 
Unplanned Changes 
It is not uncommon for systems already in production to incorporate significant 
design changes that were not foreseen by the program. Reasons for this can include urgent 
operational needs from the field, correction of defects discovered post-fielding, 
implementation of Value Engineering proposals, or response to changes in the 
adversary/threat environment. 
It is clearly unreasonable to require programs to report things they are not yet 
planning to do. For unplanned changes, the challenge is how to report them as they are 
discovered and after the fact, in ways that transparently describe the reasons for any 
corresponding cost and schedule changes. 
It would be ideal if SAR reporting of unplanned changes distinguished clearly 
between design changes driven by new performance requirements and changes required to 
meet the original program requirements. One possible way to accomplish this would be to 
add a new category, “Requirements,” to the list of SAR variance categories. Cost changes 
due to design changes required to meet original program requirements (as of the current 
APB) would be classified as engineering variances. Cost changes due to new or modified 
performance requirements would be classified as requirements changes. For a program with 
a P3I subprogram, the base program and P3I subprogram would report separate cost 
variances, using the new category where appropriate. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that programs would report these categories accurately. 
Not only are there strong incentives to categorize all cost growth as being due to new 
requirements, but there is often genuine confusion within the program office about which 
requirements are part of the baseline and which have been added during the course of 
development and production. In theory, the Cost Analysis Requirements Document and 
other mandatory acquisition documents establish the baseline requirements assumed by the 
baseline cost estimate. In practice, this is not as clear, especially for programs that have 
been re-baselined at some point. 
Block Upgrades, Evolutionary Acquisition, and Agile Development 
Some programs know in advance that they intend to upgrade or replace the initial 
design with an improved future design, but do not yet know what those changes will be or 
what they will cost. They may not know which attributes will be enhanced, since that 
decision will be based on developments in the future. If multiple changes are made to the 
weapon system design at a few discrete points in time, these are often termed block 
upgrades. If many changes are made on an ongoing basis as their usefulness becomes 
known, this is sometimes referred to as evolutionary acquisition. In the special case of 
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software programs doing repeated rapid insertion of new features in close collaboration with 
the users of the software, it is called agile development. 
In each of these cases, the reporting challenge is that the program knows that they 
intend to spend money in the future, but they do not know what they will be spending it on, 
what it will cost, or when it will happen. The challenges for oversight and management are 
obvious—especially when a program being managed in this way is shoehorned into a 
reporting system designed for unchanging units. This is part of what happened to the RQ 4B 
Global Hawk program, which was intended from the beginning as an evolutionary 
acquisition but was required to guess both content and schedule of future upgrades as part 
of its original acquisition baseline. Those guesses were then treated as firm requirements by 
the acquisition system, even after Air Force leaders had changed their minds about both 
priorities and threshold performance. 
In the case of block upgrades, one possibility is to simply declare a new program for 
each block. This is the approach taken by the AIM-9, AIM-9X, AIM-9X Block II missile 
programs; the F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft programs; and the UH-60L and UH-
60M Blackhawk helicopter programs (among many others).  
Other programs have treated successive blocks as distinct official subprograms. This 
approach was taken by the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program. The 
original program had no subprograms and developed the AGM-158 missile. During that 
development, the Air Force studied possible improvements to the missile and decided to 
develop a second variant with longer range. The original AGM-158 was redesignated AGM-
158A, and the new “JASSM-ER” (Extended Range) was designated AGM-158B. The 
program was split into two subprograms for reporting purposes, with JASSM-ER schedule, 
development costs, and production costs (and cost variances) reported separately. The 
Navy went even further with the new AGM-158C (LRASM) variant, deciding to make it a 
distinct program5 rather than creating a new subprogram within the JASSM program. This 
may be because the new program is Navy-only, while JASSM is an Air Force program.6 
An advantage of these approaches is that they isolate the unit cost of the new block 
from the past, rather than computing an average over all past blocks. It would defeat the 
purpose of the N-M legislation if 50% APUC growth in what is essentially a new weapon 
system became invisible because it was being averaged together with thousands of past 
units of completely different design.7 A second advantage is that the block upgrade is clearly 
identifiable as design changes to meet new requirements, as opposed to design changes to 
overcome technical difficulties in achieving the original requirement. 
One disadvantage of the subprogram approach, as currently implemented, is that an 
N-M breach by any block triggers a mandatory review of every subprogram, as is discussed 
later. 
                                            
 
 
5 PNO 449, “Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 1 (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile),” 
abbreviated as “OASuW Inc 1 (LRASM)” 
6 The “J” in JASSM stands for “joint,” and at one point there was consideration of mounting this 
weapon on Navy aircraft. However, that has not happened, and all of the funds in the SAR are 
reported from Air Force appropriations. 
7 This is what has happened with the AIM-120 AMRAAM program, as described in the Unplanned 
Changes section. 
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A disadvantage of both subprograms and separate programs is the difficulty of 
accounting for shared RDT&E, nonrecurring, and support costs, such as for testing 
equipment or software that is used by multiple blocks. For example, the RQ-4B Global Hawk 
family all uses a common ground station. If this program had used separate subprograms 
for each distinct aircraft design, it would be inappropriate for the original RQ 4A subprogram 
to bear the cost of all upgrades to the ground station systems and software, given that all 
blocks benefit from those upgrades. 
A logical response to this problem would be for the Global Hawk program to make 
the ground station systems a separate subprogram. The difficulty with this is that it would 
create the possibility of an N-M breach due to cost growth in a subprogram that accounts for 
only a small fraction of total program cost. A more reasonable approach would be for 
programs to be able to declare a single subprogram responsible for procurement of items 
other than end items. This subprogram would only be liable for an N-M breach if its 
estimated total cost (RDT&E + Procurement) grew to exceed a threshold percentage of the 
estimated PAUC for the overall program, which would require new legislation from the 
Congress. 
Possible Methods for Handling Mixed Types 
As the examples in Mixed Types show, many solutions have been found to the 
mixed type problem, but all of them have drawbacks.  
Subprograms 
For some programs, subprograms have provided an elegant solution. For example, 
the Army’s original Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) program distinguished two 
subprograms: the mobile rocket launcher and the tactical rocket it would fire. This allowed 
the program to accurately track unit cost growth for both of the fully configured end items 
being developed and produced. The launcher was produced within its original cost estimate; 
the rocket experienced a critical N-M breach.8 Similarly, the Army’s PAC-3 suite of upgrades 
to the Patriot missile system was (after several schedule breaches in the first few years of 
development) divided into subprograms for the Missile Segment and the Fire Unit. 
The fact that a unit cost breach in any subprogram triggers a breach in the whole 
program discourages their use, even where it seems like an obvious solution. A program 
without subprograms often has more leeway to do things that will make the cost growth look 
smaller. For example, if the MLRS program had not defined subprograms, but had treated 
the rockets as the end-item units, they would have shown a lower percentage cost growth 
for the combined program than was seen for just the rocket subprogram. In addition, the 
program could have decided to produce fewer launchers than originally planned, reducing 
both PAUC and APUC without changing the official number of units being produced. Doing 
so might have avoided the N-M breach, at the cost of greatly reduced transparency 
regarding cost growth and reduced capability. 
Making subprograms more appealing would require congressional action, possibly in 
an annual authorization bill, which seems possible if some way to maintain program cost 
accountability could be devised. The Congress might be willing to allow the Milestone 
                                            
 
 
8 Unfortunately, the program did not similarly distinguish the variant rockets being produced or the 
later conversion of the entire system from an unguided rocket launcher to a guided missile launcher. 
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Decision Authority to designate alternative triggers for programs with subprograms, 
especially if some of the subprograms involve far fewer dollars than others. 
In theory, SAR reporting could be expanded so that each program could report 
simultaneously on multiple distinct end items without declaring subprograms. The principal 
distinction between this approach and subprograms would (presumably) be the mechanisms 
for deciding cost and schedule breaches. As with subprograms, it would be important in 
implementing this change to avoid creating perverse incentives to PMs. In particular, 
accurately defining multiple end items should not increase a program’s chances of 
experiencing an N-M breach. 
Multiple Programs 
If a Service is planning to buy a mix of different end items in response to a given set 
of mission needs, they have some flexibility in deciding how to group those efforts into 
programs. It is not always obvious which grouping would best serve the needs of both the 
Service and the oversight community. 
At one (unfortunate) extreme, the Army decided to make Future Combat Systems a 
single program with literally hundreds of different physical products ranging in size and 
complexity from light tanks down to man-portable UASs, along with many tens of millions of 
lines of software implementing communications, mission command, and networked fires. 
The official units for that program were Brigade Sets, of which 15 were to be produced. A 
prime “lead systems integrator” contract was awarded, with authority to reconsider the mix 
and capabilities of systems to be developed and procured in each Brigade Set. This offered 
no useful insight into the program’s activities or progress. 
At the other extreme, the Army decided to split procurement of their new AH-64E 
Apache helicopters into two separate programs, one for remanufactured aircraft and the 
other for new builds. A 2008 acquisition decision memorandum signed by the Army 
Acquisition Executive contains the following language. 
As a recently delegated Acquisition Category IC program, the AH-64E 
Apache program is comprised of two separate programs, the Remanufacture 
program and the New Build program. Each of these programs are separate 
and distinct with respect to the Acquisition Program Baselines (APB), and 
their funding lines; however, they have identical configurations and are 
produced on the same production line. (Shyu, 2013) 
The choice to create two MDAPs creates challenges for both the Army and OSD 
because it adds extra reviews and recordkeeping. Having multiple programs, as with 
subprograms, creates two triggers for an N-M breach, but it also means that any breach 
would affect only one of the two programs, whereas creating two subprograms would 
expose the entire program. It also splits what naturally feels like one program—indeed, the 
previous language refers to it both as one program and as two in the same paragraph. Since 
both programs produce identical new AH-64E helicopters, why should they be separated? 
Although distinct for reporting purposes, they have common goals and management. They 
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share a PM and a production contract,9 but only the remanufacture program reports any 
RDT&E costs. Even within Apache, both programs list “Other Support” funds in their SARs, 
and since the two programs are producing identical helicopters, it is unclear how the Army 
decides whether a given support purchase will be credited to one program or the other. One 
cannot understand what is going on in either program without considering the other, which 
would seem to violate the notion of what constitutes a program. Where there is only one 
distinct end item, having multiple programs is questionable. 
Multiple programs should only be considered as an option in the case of block 
upgrades to an existing program (as discussed in the section titled Block Upgrades, 
Evolutionary Acquisition, and Agile Development), or when the set of things to be procured 
by a proposed new program involves the following: 
 Significantly different product types with different acquisition risks, 
 Multiple independent contracts with no real synergies, and 
 Few significant interoperability requirements among systems. 
In general, it is rarely appropriate to split a new proposal into multiple programs.  
An example of a program that perhaps should have been split into multiple programs 
is the Stryker (originally “Interim Armored Vehicle”) program. This program procured eight 
specialized variants of an existing non-developmental armored vehicle. Of these eight 
variants, six were relatively minor modifications of the existing design, while two10 required 
extensive engineering changes to the original. An appropriate program management 
strategy would have been to make the six “minor modification” variants a single program 
(with six subprograms), and the two major redesigns either a second program with two 
subprograms, or two additional separate programs. That would have isolated the 
development risks of the two most risky projects from the more straightforward projects and 
would have given the OSD and the Congress better visibility of how the various projects 
were progressing. As it happened, the Stryker program experienced a significant (but not 
critical) N-M breach, driven entirely by problems in the two major redesign vehicles. 
Different Cost Categories 
Using the different cost categories in current SAR reporting can give some visibility 
into what is happening in a program, but generally does not allow better identification of 
different unit types. The distinction between end items and non-end items was not designed 
to capture differences among multiple distinct end items. 
The Air Force’s UAS MQ-9 Reaper program plans to procure 347 units, where each 
unit is an aircraft. The total procurement cost for the program is $9.2 billion in BY 2008 
dollars, but only 52% of that is EIRF. Another 22% is categorized as NEIRF, and the 
remaining 26% is Total Support. This information is useful for cost analysts, although this 
                                            
 
 
9 The December 2015 SAR for the remanufacture program lists four procurement contracts and two 
RDT&E contracts. The new build SAR only shows one contract, which is one of the four procurement 
contracts in the remanufacture program. 
10 The two were the M1128 Mobile Gun System (MGS), which attempted to mount a tank-like 105 mm 
direct fire cannon on a relatively light wheeled vehicle; and the M1135 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, 
Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBC RV), which required a suite of sophisticated environmental sensors 
and a positive-overpressure internal environment. 
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distribution has no impact on N-M reporting.11 The aircraft quantity can be compared to the 
EIRF to understand those units, but there are no quantities reported for ground stations, so 
an analyst can only know what has been spent on them in total, not what each costs. In this 
case, NEIRF is something like a subprogram for the ground stations, but it is less 
transparent than actual subprograms would be. 
Reducing Accidents 
When humans carry out activities, accidents are inevitable. Reducing accidents 
requires good processes. We have not analyzed the process for generating SARs or PB 
submissions. In principle, that could (and perhaps should) be done from a quality assurance 
point of view. 
We were also told that AT&L/Acquisition Resource and Analysis (ARA) performs the 
OSD’s checks on Service-submitted data, and they do not have enough time to do it 
thoroughly. All of the draft SARs arrive at the OSD in the same season. About a week after 
the data arrive, ARA meets with each program for about one hour, at which time ARA can 
ask questions. They feel that this process is insufficient and clearly there are changes that 
could reduce the accident rate. 
The best way to improve ARA’s review is probably not only to add more time. While 
more time might help, ARA would probably also benefit from specialized tools to help them 
analyze the draft SAR data and quickly compare them to budget submissions, prior year 
SARs, and general rules about how acquisition programs typically behave. Proposing 
improvements to that process is beyond the scope of this report. 
A Thought Experiment: JLTV 
To illustrate the kind of reporting that would be necessary to improve both oversight 
and data utility for cost analysts, we looked at the JLTV program. The full analysis is in our 
full report (Davis et al., 2017). We determined that at the beginning of the program, seven 
subprograms might be appropriate, as indicated in Table 2. 
Table 2. Suggested Initial JLTV Subprograms 
 
This would not be practical if an N-M breach could be triggered by any one of them. 
                                            
 
 
11 One could imagine the Air Force lowering the ratio of ground stations to aircraft, not for operational 
reasons but rather because they want to control APUC. 
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Conclusions 
The default assumption for any acquisition program is that all of the units it produces 
are identical and interchangeable. This is seldom true—consider asking an F 35A to land on 
a ship. Any analysis that assumes interchangeable units is making an unwarranted 
assumption that can lead to mistaken conclusions. The importance of these mistakes will 
vary, both with the details of the program and the nature of the analysis. We hope that this 
work can lead to two kinds of changes: one for analysts using acquisition data, and a 
second for policy makers defining reporting requirements for programs. 
For analysts, the primary message is “Beware.” It is not uncommon for invisible 
differences between units to be important to an analysis, as we saw with previous IDA 
studies of hedonic price indices for aircraft and tactical vehicles discussed in the Changes 
Over Time chapter. Without additional data from non-SAR (and sometimes non-PB) 
sources, it is often impossible to understand the relationships between price, cost, and 
quantity in many programs. Such additional data are, unfortunately, not always available. 
Analysts need to know the limits of what can be inferred from the existing data. 
For policy makers, there are many opportunities to improve data reporting 
requirements and guidance, and these come in three varieties. First, there ought to be 
explicit acknowledgment that not all units are identical, and some effort should be made to 
quantify unit-by-unit or lot-by-lot differences for analysis and oversight. Second, the rules 
need to encourage the desired behaviors. The current N-M rules are an excellent example 
of how rules incentivize behavior in ways that may be counterproductive. For example, 
IDECM’s unit costs could be reduced by purchasing more towed decoys. When designing 
new reporting requirements, policy makers need to keep this in mind. Finally, the quality 
assurance processes applied to official data ought to be studied and improved. While some 
accidents are inevitable, the system today probably lets through more than it should. SARs 
are much like custom manufactured parts. Each one is unique, but good processes could 
still make them more uniform and useful.  
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